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ABSTRACT
The difficulty of incorporating general equilibrium price effects into econometric estimating
equations has deterred most researchers from econometrically estimating the welfare gains from trade
liberalization. Using a paired-down CES monopolistic competition example, we show that this
difficulty has been greatly exaggerated. Along the way, we estimate – indeed precisely estimate –
large welfare gains from trade liberalization as measured by compensating variation.
Unlike calibration methods, econometric methods allow researchers to isolate the violence done
by the model to the data. We find that the CES monopolistic competition model horribly mis-
specifies behavioural price elasticities and general equilibrium price feedbacks. The model as
conceived is therefore of limited value for analysing the effects of trade liberalization. We report a
number of specification issues that should point the way to better theoretical modeling.
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trefler@chass.utoronto.caIn the mid 1970s, as negotiations for the Tokyo Round of tariff reductions gathered
momentum, a spate of papers appeared offering assessments of the potential effects of
such an agreement. Weaknesses in the prevailing input-output methodology led Robert
Stern to solicit new approaches from two promising junior faculty members. The ﬁrst
proposed a sound econometric strategy, but arrived at results that could generously be
called ‘mixed.’ The second proposed a linearized computable general equilibrium model
that yielded remarkably plausible results. The junior faculty in this apocryphal story are
Ed Leamer and Alan Deardorff. (See Leamer, Stern and Baum 1977 and Deardorff, Stern
and Baum 1977.) We relate this story because it marks a watershed. Deardorff’s Michigan
Model along with developments by John Whalley, Rick Harris and others foretold the as-
cendancy of computable general equilibrium modelling over econometrics in discussions
of international trade policy.
The ﬁrst goal of this paper is to re-establish the role of standard econometric methods for
estimating the welfare gains from world-wide tariff liberalization. Our starting point is the CES
monopolistic competition model with its closed-form predictions about compensating
variation and bilateral trade (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). The
bilateral trade prediction was initially examined by Lawrence (1987) and Saxonhouse
(1989). Its popularity rose with the careful analysis of Harrigan (1993; 1996). Most of
the related econometric literature has focussed on the prediction’s gravity-style income
terms rather than its price terms. Harrigan (1993), Haveman, Reichert and Thursby (1999),
and Anderson and Mercouiller (1999) are exceptions. However, these authors all simplify
the complex price term that captures both the behavioural and general equilibrium re-
sponses to falling trade costs. One cannot assess the impact of trade liberalization without
knowing how economic agents respond to product prices. Thus, unless this complex
price term is carefully modelled, estimating welfare gains is not possible. Fortunately,
we demonstrate that estimating the mean and standard error of welfare gains is easy once
price responses have been appropriately modelled. In an application to the elimination of
tariffs, our estimation strategy yields large and precisely estimated gains from trade liberalization
1e.g., one-time compensating variation gains of 0.4 percent with a standard error of less
than 0.1 percent.
In terms of our ﬁrst goal, this paper is closely related to Eaton and Kortum (2002) who
estimate complex behavioural and general equilibrium price responses in the context of a
Ricardian model. They also compute the welfare gains from trade liberalization. We go a
little further by treating welfare gains as an uncertain quantity whose mean and standard
error must be estimated. Our aim of estimating welfare gains is shared by Feenstra (1988)
and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) who provide in-depth studies of the welfare gains
from automotive sector voluntary export restraints. See Feenstra (1995) for a review of the
literature.
The second goal of this paper is to econometrically assess the model for evidence of mis-
speciﬁcation. Estimated welfare gains are model-dependent: if the model is inadequate, so
too are the welfare estimates. Our focus is on whether the CES monopolistic competition
model adequately captures price effects. Here we extend the work of Harrigan (1996),
Jensen (2000), and Evenett and Keller (2002) who carefully examined the behavioural
income elasticities implied by the model. Our work is also related to the volume-of-trade
equations considered by Helpman (1987), Hummels and Levinsohn (1993, 1995), and
Debaere (2002), though it is not obvious how these volume-of-trade equations can be
extended to include price effects.
The analysis is built upon a new and labouriously constructed database on bilateral
tariff rates for 14 importers trading with 36 exporters over the 1972-1992 period for
28 manufacturing industries. (Our sample size is dictated by the availability of scarce
bilateral tariff data.) In our search for potential mis-speciﬁcations of the behavioural
and general equilibrium import responses to tariff changes, we examine both within and
between country-pair sample variation. Estimates based on the between country-pair
sample variation exploit the fact that, for example, the United States both imports more
from Canada than from Iran and has lower tariffs against Canada than Iran. That is, the
‘between’ estimates blithely assume that all other differences between Canada and Iran
2have been adequately modelled. This assumption is questionable. Estimates of import
responses based on the within country-pair sample variation exploit the fact that U.S. im-
ports from Canada grew after implementation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
That is, the ‘within’ estimates do not compare Canada with Iran. We ﬁnd that the model’s
estimated behavioural and general equilibrium import responses to tariff changes explain only a
modest amount of the between country-pair sample variation and none of the more informative
within country-pair sample variation. This result is deeply disconcerting – it means that our
welfare conclusions are being driven primarily by the model, not the data. We also report
a large number of other speciﬁcation and mis-speciﬁcation facts that should point the way
to better theoretical modelling of the effects of trade liberalization.
Returning to our ﬁrst goal of estimating the welfare gains from trade liberalization, we must
be very careful not to overstate what we have accomplished. The model we use is paired down
as compared to the sophistication of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. For
example, while we model the effect of trade liberalization on the international distribution
of production using a careful instrumental-variables approach, our speciﬁcation analysis
suggests that the welfare results are primarily driven by the distorting effects of tariffs
on consumption decisions. In textbook terminology, we are primarily capturing the
consumption distortion rather than the production distortion.
Finally, our empirical results have implications for CGE models. (The debate about
econometrics versus CGE techniques is not about who can go over Niagara Falls with
more style. Each has its own advantages.) A key parameter for these models is the
elasticity of substitution between varieties. We demonstrate that estimates of the welfare
gains from tariff reductions can be sensitive to the choice of elasticity of substitution. We
estimate this parameter using the type of model and sample variation that is relevant
for CGE models. Our estimates of between 5 and 8 are lower than those typically (but
not always) used in the literature. For example, Brown and Stern (1989) use 15. Our
estimates are more similar to those in Feenstra (1994), but often smaller than those implied
by Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995).
3The outline of the paper is as follows. The ﬁrst part (sections 1-6) speciﬁes the model,
estimates it, and draws out implications for the welfare gains from future rounds of tariff
cuts. The second part (sections 7-11) points to various problems with the CES monopol-
istic competition speciﬁcation, especially mis-speciﬁcation of the price term.
1. Theory
We are interested in the standard CES monopolistic competition trade prediction. There
is a single consumer in each country and preferences are internationally identical. Con-
sumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over goods and CES preferences over varieties.
2-stage budgeting allows us to concentrate on the decision about varieties. Let i index
consumer countries, let j index producer countries, and let g index goods. Let ω index
varieties and let Ngj be the measure (number) of varieties produced in country j. Let
qgij(ω) be i’s consumption of variety ω produced in country j. Let pgj(ω) be the producer
price and let τgij be one plus the ad valorem tariff so that pgj(ω)τgij is the price faced by
consumers in country i. Given data constraints, there are no beneﬁts from allowing τgij to













In equilibrium, σg is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The δgij are most
readily thought of as Armington (1969) parameters. They have other interpretations, but
we do not push on any particular one since the δgij play almost no role in our empirical
work. Given 2-stage budgeting, the country i representative consumer chooses the qgij (ω)
to maximize Ugi subject to prices pgj(ω)τgij and income αgYi where Yi is national income.
Producers face constant marginal costs cg and ﬁxed costs Fg.1 Utility maximization,
proﬁt maximization, and zero proﬁts together imply (1) that the equilibrium producer
1In an earlier version of the paper we allowed Fg and cg to vary internationally. This allowed us to
examine international differences in costs as a source of comparative advantage. While this provided the
predicted insights, the paper is already too long to include it. Lai (1999) develops this more sophisticated
cost side in a multinationals context.
4price pgj(ω) is independent of j and ω, (2) that the equilibrium producer supply qgj(ω)
is independent of j and ω, and (3) that equilibrium consumer demands qgij(ω) are inde-
pendent of ω. Denote these by pg, qg, and qgij, respectively. Tedious but familiar algebra












Moving from varieties to goods, let Qgj ≡ qgNgj be country j’s output of good g and
let Mgij ≡ qgijNgj be country i’s consumption of j’s good g. For i 6= j, Mgij is i’s imports
from j. For i = j, Mgii is i’s consumption of goods produced in i. Multiplying equation (2)












To eliminate the unobservable pg and to push as hard as possible on the theory, we
introduce the data identity that what country j produces (Qgj) equals what country j ships
to the world, including itself (∑i Mgij). This is consistent with supply equalling demand.





Mgij/∑n Mgnj is i’s share of j’s shipments. To see that equation (4) appears repeatedly
in, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985), note that in the absence of tariffs
Mgij/∑n Mgnj = si where si ≡ Yi/∑n Yn is i’s share of world income. Thus, equation (4)
reduces to the familiar Mgij = siQgj. Plugging equation (3) into equation (4) and taking
logs yields


























5and where δg ≡ {δgij}∀ij. Setting δgij = 1, the denominator of Φgij is the ‘real’ income of j’s
trading partners i.e., the si are deﬂated by the CES price index. This denominator is often
called the ‘market potential’ function for country j. See Hanson (1998). To summarize,




, and a data-identity term Qgj
that enters via the identity (4).
Much of the econometric literature dealing with monopolistic competition has focussed
on income effects to the exclusion of price effects e.g., gravity equations. To the extent
that tariffs have been introduced they never enter into the estimating equation in the way
suggestedbyequation(6). Rather, tariffsareintroducedinavarietyofways, eachaspecial
case of the following expression: βg lnτgij + λgi + λ0
gj where λgi and λ0
gj are ﬁxed effects.








gnk Qgk], and βg = −σg. This has led many researchers to equate βg
with −σg and to interpret βg as a behavioural or general equilibrium response to tariffs.














That is, βg has no behavioural or general equilibrium interpretation. In contrast, Φgij
captures the theoretically correct behavioural and general equilibrium import responses
to tariffs. This tariff response is exactly what is at stake in discussions surrounding the
effects of trade liberalization. If the Φgij term is not fully understood empirically then
neither is trade liberalization. To date, Φgij is far from being understood empirically.
2. The Data
The data on trade ﬂows come from Statistics Canada’s World Trade Database. Data on
income are from the World Bank. Data on gross output are from UNIDO’s INDSTAT
database. All these data have been cleaned up, deﬂated, and purchasing-power-parity
(PPP) adjusted as described in Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002). None of the results are
sensitive to the deﬂation method or to the use of PPP adjustments so that we need not
6go into details on these points. Industrial disaggregation is at the level of 3-digit ISIC
which consists of 28 industries. The years used are 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992.
The major data-gathering exercise for this paper has been the building of a time series
on bilateral tariffs by industry and year. Most of the data come from different waves
of the GATT Tariff Study which we have collected surreptitiously over the years. They
also come from the UNCTAD TRAINS database. Appendix C sifts through the large
number of data details. Note that what we call tariffs also includes discriminatory internal
taxes. For developing countries these taxes are often substantial. The choice of countries
(14 importers and 36 exporters) was dictated by the availability of these data. Table 1
reports the countries used. The 14 importers are the United States, Canada, Japan, and 11
European countries. Even though we will only be considering 14 importers, the theory
states that we need the bilateral tariffs for every country in the world. See equation (6).
Finding bilateral tariffs for the entire world is not feasible. Instead, we concentrated on
obtaining tariffs for the major trading partners of our 14 importers. Table 1 lists the 22
countrieswhich, alongwiththeinitialour14importers, ﬁllsoutthemajortradingpartners
of our 14 importers. The 1992 data for the 22 additional trading partners are from the
TRAINS database. For earlier years, they are from a wide variety of sources and involve
some imputation when neither member of the bilateral pair is in our list of 14 importers.
See Appendix C for details. The assembled bilateral, sector-speciﬁc panel data set for
tariffs represents a major improvement on the types of tariff data previously used.
3. Estimation
Let i = 1, ..., 14 index consuming countries, let j = 1, ..., 36 index producing countries,
let g = 1, ..., 28 index 3-digit ISIC (revision 2) industries, and let t = 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987,
1992 index years. For each industry separately we estimate the equation




+ lnQgjt + λgij + εgijt (7)
7Table 1. List of Importers and Exporters Table 1.  List of Importers and Exporters
14 Importers and Exporters 22 Exporters
Europe Other OECD Asia Other
Belgium U.S.A. Australia Hong Kong Argentina
Germany Canada New Zealand Indonesia Brazil
Denmark Japan Spain India Chile
Finland Portugal Korea Ecuador
France Sweden Sri Lanka Venezuela
Greece Austria Malaysia





where the following hold. From equation (6), Φgijt(σg,δg) depends on the data {sit}∀it,
{Qgjt}∀jt, and {τgijt}∀ijt. λgij are country-pair ﬁxed effects. We assume that the εgijt are
generated by an AR(1) process
εgijt = ρgεgij,t−1 + νgijt (8)










In equation (9), si is the average value of the ﬁve sit. The unknown parameters are σg, δgij,
λgij, ρg, ωg, and ηg.
We emphasize that while ﬁxed effects are standard in the literature, AR(1) and general-
ized least squares (GLS) corrections are not. Arguably, the GLS correction is not important
in a log speciﬁcation though this remains to be seen. However, the AR(1) correction is
central because without it, the sample size over-states the amount of independent sample
information, thus leading to overly small standard errors and overly large t-statistics.
(Indeed, we ﬁnd that the ‘effective’ sample size is less than two thirds of the actual sample
size where ‘effective’ is deﬁned as the denominator of appendix equation A 5 below.) With
8this in mind, we ﬁnd it remarkable that no other study in this area has incorporated AR(1)
corrections or, for that matter, a combination of AR(1), ﬁxed effect, and GLS corrections.
We employ a variety of estimation strategies. In the next section we consider maximum
likelihood (ML) and non-linear least squares (NLS) methods. In section 5 we consider in-
strumental variable (IV) methods based on Arellano and Bond’s (1991) approach. Details
of the estimators are relegated to Appendix A and Appendix B.
4. Empirical Results
We start with aggregate manufacturing before moving on to results by 3-digit ISIC in-
dustry. To emphasize this we drop the g subscripts. Table 2 presents estimates for aggreg-
ate manufacturing. The ﬁrst column presents our baseline speciﬁcation which excludes
the home-bias parameter i.e., δij = 1 for all i and j. The estimate of σ is 5.30 with a 0.40
standard error. This estimate is at the low end of the numbers usually considered in the
CGE literature. For example, Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1997) use 8, Brown and Stern
(1989) use 15, and Wei (1996) uses 20. Exceptions are Harris (1984) and Shiells and Reinert
(1991) who use numbers close to unity. The estimate is also much lower than those in
Harrigan (1993). His median value of b σg across 28 industries is 30 which is much larger
than our median value (reported below) of 5.50.
From the last line of column 1, the correlation between ln Mijt and lnsitΦijtQjt is a high
0.88. More precisely, this is the correlation between the scaled variables (ln Mijt)/ψij and
(lnsitΦijtQjt)/ψij where ψij ≡ (sisj)b ωb η
p
1 − b ρ2 is the estimated standard error of εijt. See
equations (7)-(9). Note that all correlations and plots in this paper will use scaled variables
unless stated otherwise.
The GLS correction b ω = −0.12 is negative, indicating that less weight is being given
to country pairs for which both partners are small. Column 2 of table 2 drops the GLS
correction by setting ω to 0. The likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis of ω = 0
(χ2
1 = 268). Despite this, setting ω to 0 barely changes b σ.















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Elast. of subs. (σ) 5.30 5.57 29.41 6.84 5.05 4.76
(0.40) (0.41) (0.70) (0.49) (0.37) (0.73)
AR(1) correction (ρ) 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.43
(0.026) (0.026) (0.0025) (0.023)
GLS correction (ω) -0.12 0.00 -0.04 -0.14 -0.10 -0.16
(0.0071) (0.0077) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0080)
Loglikelihood -99 -233 -3336 -1129 -155 288
Regression std. error 0.05 0.44 2.57 0.05 0.08 0.02
Goodness of fit 0.88 0.72 0.80 0.90 0.86 0.91
Notes: The baseline specification is in logs with AR(1), fixed effect, and GLS corrections. See equations (7)-(9). There
is no home bias (δij = 1 for all i and j) in any specification. Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 2,520
observations involving 504 country pairs (14 importers x 36 exporters) and 5 years (1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992). (In
column 6 there are only 4 years.)  'Goodness of fit' is the correlation between ln(M ijt) and ln(s it Φijt Q jt).
Column 3 shows that when the ﬁxed effect and AR(1) corrections are omitted, b σ grows
to 29.41. This emphatically illustrates that the between country-pair sample variation
associated with previous cross-sectional studies produces radically different estimates
than those based on within country-pair sample variation.
Column 4 shows that omitting the ﬁxed effect while keeping the AR(1) correction raises
b σ only a little (b σ = 6.84). However, this is not to say that the ﬁxed effects are unimportant.
What has happened is that the ﬁxed effects are now absorbed in the AR(1) process. This
can be seen from the fact that b ρ equals 0.96 so that we are effectively differencing out the
ﬁxed effects. The likelihood ratio test statistic rejects the hypothesis of no ﬁxed effects
(χ2
1 = 2,060), indicating that the ﬁxed effects are crucial for understanding the between
country-pair sample variation. This point has previously been made by Hummels and
Levinsohn (1995) and others. However, since b ρ is close to unity when the λij are omit-
10ted, we should be thinking of dynamic interpretations of the λij rather than just static
interpretations such as omitted distance effects. We will return to this point shortly.
The standard approach to AR(1) modelling involves differencing the data (e.g.,
ln Mgijt − ρln Mgij,t−1 and νgijt = εgijt − ρεgij,t−1) and working with (νgij77, ..., νgij92).
Given the shortness of the ﬁve-year panel, we apply a standard correction that allows us
to keep the 1972 observation. That is, it allows us to work with (εgij72, νgij77, ..., νgij92).
This correction is described fully in Appendix A. We have been careful to keep the ﬁrst
observation because it has frequently been pointed out that dropping it results in a serious
loss of efﬁciency e.g., (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, chapter 10.6). In column 6 of table
10 we report the effect of dropping the ﬁrst observation (1972). b σ falls only a little (to 4.76),
butthestandarderroralmostdoubles(to0.73). Thishighlightstheimportanceofretaining
the ﬁrst, informative observation. This will prove important when we turn below to IV
methods.
Figure 1 plots ln Mijt against lnsitΦijt(b σ)Qjt for our baseline speciﬁcation. Both are
scaledbytheGLScorrectionsothattheunitsarestandarddeviations. Thehighcorrelation
of 0.88 is reﬂected in the plot. In the plot, a ‘o’ marks domestic observations (i = j) and
an ‘x’ marks foreign observations (i 6= j). The former all lie above the predicted 45o line
whereas the latter mostly lie below. This graphically illustrates that trade is missing relative to
its theoretical prediction, just as in Treﬂer’s (1995) “case of the missing trade.”
Figure 1 suggests that the results may be sensitive to the inclusion of domestic observa-
tions. Table 3 investigates. Column 1 is the baseline speciﬁcation from table 3. Column 2
shows that b σ does not change when the domestic consumption observations are excluded.
Column 3 of table 3 introduces home bias. In the baseline speciﬁcation we imposed
δij = 1 for all i and j. In the home bias speciﬁcation we restrict the δij so that δii = 1 for
all i and δij = δ for j 6= i. δ is estimated to be 0.86, indicating that 1 unit of a foreign good
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Figure 1. Model Fit: ln Mijt vs. lnsitΦijtQjt
However, the t-statistic for the hypothesis that δ = 1 is 1.08.2 Further, our estimates of δ
are very fragile, meaning that they bounce around substantially across speciﬁcations. In
particular, while they are rarely in excess of 1.2, they often fall to 0.001 which is so low as
to be economically meaningless. Such low values of b δ are reminiscent of Treﬂer’s (1995)
results on home bias. It is important to note that no matter what value b δ takes, the estimate
of σ is always close to its baseline value of 5.30. We thus restrict δ to equal unity in all that
follows.
Column 4 of table 3 examines potential outliers. There are two exporters in our data
base with unusual data, India with its tariffs and other discriminatory internal taxes in
2 If δii is set equal to δ rather than 1, then δ is not be identiﬁed. See equation (6). This means that very few
observations – only those with (i,i) subscripts – contribute sample variation useful for estimating δ. Thus,
we expect imprecise estimates of δ.













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Elasticity of substitution (σ) 5.30 5.27 5.47 5.13 5.44
(0.40) (0.40) (0.47) (0.47) (0.44)
Home Bias (δ) 0.86
(0.13)
AR(1) Correction (ρ) 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.45
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.30)
GLS correction (ω) -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
(0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0078) (0.0071) (0.0074)
Loglikelihood -99 -127 -99 -42.35 -129
Regression standard error 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Corr( ln(M ijt) , ln(s it Φ ijtQ jt) ) 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.90 0.88
Notes: The baseline specification is in logs with AR(1), fixed effect, and GLS corrections and there is no home bias (δ
= 1 for all i and j). Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 2,520 observations in the baseline specification.
excess of 100 percent and Hong Kong with its Chinese entrepb ot trade and low tariffs.
Column 4 shows that India and Hong Kong are not inﬂuential observations.
Column 5 of table 3 shows that it does not matter whether we move from our baseline
maximum likelihood (ML) estimator to a nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimator (b σ =
5.44). Details of the two estimators appear in Appendix A.
To summarize, we have considered an array of speciﬁcations dealing with ﬁxed effects,
serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, treatment of ﬁrst observations, ML versus NLS, po-
tential outliers (domestic observations, Hong Kong, and India) and the role of home bias.
Allofthesepointtoanestimateof σ tightlycenteredaround5. Thisislowerthanestimates
used by most modelers of the effects of trade liberalization e.g., Brown and Stern (1989)
use 15.
135. IV Results
So far, we have treated lnsitΦijt(σ)Qjt as being exogenous. The issue of endogeneity is
clearly important. The ﬁrst thing to observe is that the model can equivalently be written














At various points of this paper we will want to modestly model the process governing
the endogenous evolution of the location of production. That is, we will sometimes want
lnQjt as a right-hand-side variable and sometimes as a left-hand-side variable. Adopting
notation that is ﬂexible enough to accommodate this, we re-write equation (7) as
yijt = xijt(σ) + λij + εijt (10)
where
yijt − xijt(σ) = ln Mijt − lnsit − lnQjt − lnΦijt(σ) . (11)
and where xijt(σ) includes lnΦijt(σ). Obviously we have not yet deﬁned yijt and xijt(σ)
individually. This will come shortly.
The ML estimator of the previous section maximized the likelihood of (εij72, νij77, ...,
νij92) where νijt ≡ εijt − ρεij,t−1. To further examine the νijt, consider
yijt = ρyij,t−1 +∆ρxijt(σ) + (1 − ρ)λij + νijt t ≥ 2 (12)
where ∆ρ is the generalized difference operator given by
∆ρxijt(σ) ≡ xijt(σ) − ρxij,t−1(σ) t ≥ 2
and where the time index is now t = 1, 2, ..., T instead of t = 1972, 1977, ..., 1992.
Equation (12) highlights the fact that we are dealing with a dynamic panel. It also brings
to the fore two issues of endogeneity. First, as observed by Nickell (1981), estimation
methods that difference out the λij (as did the non-linear ﬁxed effects estimator we used
in the previous section) induce a correlation between the yij,t−1 and the transformed
14residuals. The easiest way to see this is to difference equation (12):
yijt − yij,t−1 = ρ(yij,t−1 − yij,t−2) + (∆ρxijt(σ) −∆ρxij,t−1(σ)) + (νijt − νij,t−1) t ≥ 3.
(13)
Since E(yij,t−1 − yij,t−2)(νijt − νij,t−1) = −Eyij,t−1νij,t−1 6= 0, consistent estimation requires
IVmethods. Asecondproblemariseswhenthe xijt(σ) inequation(10)areendogenousi.e.,
Exijtεijt 6= 0. This implies that E∆ρxijtνijt 6= 0 in equation (13). Both sources of endogeneity
can be handled using a modiﬁcation of Arellano and Bond’s (1991) generalized method
of moments (GMM) approach. They propose to estimate equation (13) using instruments
that exploit the full set of moment restrictions.3 These moment restrictions are
Eyijs(νijt − νij,t−1) = 0 s = 1, ..., t − 2 and t ≥ 3 (14)
and, setting the unobserved initial xij0(σ) to 0 for notational convenience,
E∆ρxijs(νijt − νij,t−1) = 0 s = 1, ..., t − 2 and t ≥ 3. (15)
We will also ﬁnd it useful to report results based on the assumption that the xijt are
exogenous. Then we can exploit the additional moment restrictions
E∆ρxijs(νijt − νij,t−1) = 0 s = t − 1, t and t ≥ 3. (16)
We will estimate equation (13) using the Arellano and Bond estimator and the moment
restrictions (14)-(16). There are a large number of details that we relegate to Appendix B.
Column 1 of table 4 repeats the ML estimates from column 2 of table 2 in which
(yij,t−1 − yij,t−2) and (xijt − xij,t−1) are treated as exogenous. To keep matters simple, we
forego the GLS correction by setting the ωg of equation (9) to 0. The remaining columns
report various IV estimates. In the top panel, ∆ρxijt(σ) is treated as exogenous while in
the bottom panel it is treated as endogenous. Each of columns 2-5 reports results using
different deﬁnitions of yijt and xijt. These deﬁnitions appear in the bottom two rows of the
table. For example, in column 2, yijt is deﬁned as ln Mijt and xijt is deﬁned as lnsitΦijtQjt.
3Note that while equation (13) is not quite the same as the Arellano and Bond set-up (∆ρxijt is both
endogenous and non-linear in σ), it is straightforward to extend their results to this setting.
15Table 4. IV Results With ∆yijt and ∆ρxijt Endogenous Table 4. IV
Specification ML GMM Instrumental Variables
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
∆ρ x ijt Exogenous
Elas. of substitution (σ) 5.57 5.03 7.05 5.50 7.08
(0.41) (12.34) (1.70) (2.31) (1.88)
AR(1) correction ( ρ ) 0.18 0.56 0.63 0.58 0.61
(0.026) (0.25) (0.27) (0.30) (0.175)
Hausman test statistic 2.56 9.78 1.90 9.05
(0.722) (0.992) (0.613) (0.989)
∆ρ x ijt Endogenous
Elas. of substitution (σ) 3.31 3.66 3.22 8.35
(29.83) (1.95) (2.21) (4.63)
AR(1) correction ( ρ ) 0.59 0.64 0.62 0.59
(0.18) (0.28) (0.19) (0.29)
Hausman test statistic 5.70 2.72 5.19 12.93
(0.942) (0.744) (0.925) (0.998)
Instrument Set
y ijt = ln M ijt ln M ijt/s itQ jt ln M ijt/Qjt ln M ijt/s it
x ijt = ln s itΦijtQ jt ln Φijt  ln s itΦijt ln ΦijtQ jt
Notes: 1) The ML estimator treats both ∆y ijt and ∆ρ x ijt as exogenous. 2) In the top panel, the IV estimator treats
∆y ijt as endogenous and ∆ρ x ijt as exogenous. In the bottom panel, the IV estimator treats both ∆y ijt and ∆ρ x ijt as
endogenous. 3) In the σ and ρ rows, standard errors are in parentheses. See footnote 4 for a discussion of standard
errors. 4) In the 'Hausman test statistic' rows, p-values are in parentheses. Large p-values indicate rejection of
exogeneity.  Boldface indicates that exogeneity is rejected at about the one percent level.
16The importance of the deﬁnitions is that they determine the choice of instruments via the
moment restrictions (14)-(16). For example, in column 2, the instrument set is built up
from lagged values of ln Mijt and lnsitΦijtQjt whereas in column 3 the instrument set is
built up from lagged values of ln Mijt/sitQjt and lnΦijt. See Appendix B for details.
The most obvious feature of the table, and the one that appears in every speciﬁcation, is
that the b ρIV are about three times larger than b ρML. This is exactly what one would expect
from attenuation bias due to endogeneity. The value of b ρIV is strikingly large: a typical
value of 0.6 implies, for instance, that a one percent rise in today’s imports transmits a
0.36 percent change in imports a decade later. Notice that this is true even though we have
controlled for ﬁxed effects. It highlights the fact that ﬁxed effects fail to capture systematic
components of bilateral import dynamics. The Hausman (1978) test for endogeneity indicates
that endogeneity is rejected at about the one percent level in column 3 (top panel) and
column 5 (both panels). These are indicated in boldface.
Nextconsidertheb σ oftable4. Inthethreespeciﬁcationsforwhichexogeneityisrejected
(the boldface speciﬁcations), b σ takes on the values of 7.05, 7.08, and 8.35. These are
somewhat higher than their ML counterpart of 5.57. There is an intriguing explanation
of this that runs in terms of the hypothesis that imports are a market-disciplining device.
(See Levinsohn, 1993; Harrison, 1994.) Consider the difference between the short-run and
long-run responses to trade liberalization. In the short run, the number of ﬁrms is constant
and, because of lags in establishing a presence in foreign markets, there is little downward
pressure on mark-ups. In the long run, the number of ﬁrms adjusts and mark-ups fall.
This is exactly what we are ﬁnding. To see this, let’s translate the above claims into
the language of our model. In the CES model, output per ﬁrm is ﬁxed so that Qjt is
proportional to the number of ﬁrms. (See the discussion following equation 2.) Thus, in
the short run Qjt is constant (exogenous) and in the long run Qjt is variable (endogenous).
Now consider σ. It has often been observed that in the CES model σ is forced to carry
the burden of being both a demand parameter and a measure of scale or mark-ups. (The
mark-up of price over marginal cost is σ/[σ−1]. Note that this is decreasing in σ.) Instead
17of thinking of σ as a demand parameter, focus instead on its interpretation as an inverse
measure of the mark-up. Then we expect σ to be larger in the long run than in the short
run. This is exactly what we ﬁnd in table 4. When Qjt is endogenous (which we interpret
as the long run), b σ is large (which we interpret as a low mark-up). Indeed, in the short
run with Qjt exogenous and b σ = 5.57, the mark-up is 22 percent. In the long run with
Qjt endogenous and with b σ = 8.35, the mark-up falls to 13 percent. If our interpretation
is correct, our results offer a new and dynamic window on the hypothesis of imports as a
market-disciplining device. 4
6. Trade Liberalization and Compensating Variation
Most econometric work in international trade focusses on predicting trade ﬂows, not
welfare gains. That the two are not the same should be obvious. For example, when
the σg are very large, trade liberalization leads to large changes in trade ﬂows with almost
no implications for welfare. Our estimates of σg together with data on expenditure shares
αg completely characterize the utility function Ui = ΠG
g=1(Ugi)αg where Ugi is deﬁned in
equation (1). (As before, we continue to set the δgij to unity.) It is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd
an expression for the indirect utility function Vi( Yi, τ | {σg}∀g). It depends on, among
other things, income Yi, the vector of tariffs worldwide τ ≡ {τgij}∀gij, and the elasticities
of substitution σg. Note that for ease of exposition we have dropped time subscripts and
re-introduced industry subscripts g. Let CVi be the compensating variation associated
with a fall in tariffs from τ to τ0. We deﬁne CVi as the percentage of income Yi that country
i is willing to pay in order to move from a high-tariff regime τ to a low-tariff regime τ0.
That is, CVi satisﬁes
Vi( Yi, τ | {σg}∀g) = Vi( (1 − CVi)Yi, τ0 | {σg}∀g).
4A feature of the b σIV that we have not commented on is their large standard errors. Part of this is the
result of eliminating two of the ﬁve years of data. We already saw in column 6 of table 2 how eliminating
the ﬁrst year of data doubles the ML standard error. Another contributor to large standard errors may be the
poor ﬁnite sample properties of standard errors based on asymptotic approximations. Indeed, the column 2
standard errors are very suspicious. Note that our estimates of standard errors based on hessians are more
stable. For example, the column 2 score-based standard error of 12.34 falls to a more sensible hessian-based
standard error of 4.03. Hausman tests using hessian-based covariance matrices always reject endogeneity.
18It is straightforward to show that with the normalization ∑g αg = 1,











The σg are not known. However, we have estimated their means and variances (see
table 10 below) and know that their asymptotic distribution is normal. This information
fully characterizes the asymptotic probability density functions of the b σg. Denote these
densities by b fg. Since the b σg were estimated separately for each industry, we assume that
they are independently distributed. This gives us all the information we need to estimate
the mean and variance of CVi.
From equations (17)-(18) and the independence of the b σg,






Calculation of E[CVi({b σg}∀g)] therefore involves the numerical integration of this integral
for each industry g = 1, ..., 28. In fact, we can do slightly better by imposing the a priori








(We do not bother introducing notation to distinguish the respective E operators in equa-
tions 20 and 21.) We will report results based on equation (21) rather than equation (20),
though as a practical matter it makes very little difference which we use.


















1 [xgi(b σg)]2b fg(σ)dσ/
R ∞
1
b fg(σ)dσ. Thus, not only can we estimate
expected compensating variation, we can also attach a standard error to the expectation.
19Table 5. Average Tariff Rates Table 5. Tariff Reductions Between 1972 and 1992
Exporters
36 Countries 14 Countries
1972 1992 1972 1992
36 Countries 12% 5% 12% 5%










Estimates of the welfare gains from trade liberalization (CVi) have appeared in the com-
putable general equilibrium literature, but rarely in the econometric literature. Estimates of
uncertainty about the expected welfare gains from trade liberalization (standard errors for
E[CVi]) are even rarer.5
Since compensating variation depends critically on the level of tariffs, table 5 reports
bilateral tariff rates for our trading partners. In 1992, the average tariff applied by our
14 importers against other members of this group was a very low 2 percent. This was
down from 6 percent in 1972. The average tariff rate applied by our 36 countries against
each other was 5 percent in 1992. Table 9 of Appendix D provides more detail about the
structure of bilateral tariffs in 1992.6
We begin by considering what would happen to welfare if our 14 importers formed
a free trade area. That is, suppose that our 14 importing countries dropped all tariffs
against each other, but retained existing tariffs against countries outside the group of 14.
Table 6 reports the E[CVi] and V[CVi] for this scenario. The welfare gains from this free
5The only study we know of that includes standard errors is the Berry et al. (1999) automotive study.
6There remains the question of what to use for αg in equation (18). The most sensible measure readily
available is value-added shares. Let g = 0 denote non-manufacturing. From the 1992 World Development
Indicators, world non-manufacturing value added as a share of world gross domestic product is 0.77. We
take this as our value of α0. For manufacturing industries, we do not have value added by detailed industry.





g=1 Qg. Then αg = (1 − α0)Qg/Q for g = 1, ..., 28. For non-manufacturing, we assume that tariffs
are zero both before and after liberalization.
20Table 6. Compensating Variation for the 14 Importing Countries Table 6. Compensating Variation for the 14 Importing Countries
Liberalize Trade Among 
the 14 Importers
Reduce 1972 Tariffs to 
1992 Tariffs Among the 
14 Importers
E[CV i] Std. Err. E[CV i] Std. Err.
14 Importers 0.43% .0004% 0.67% .0075%
North America 0.38% .0005% 0.53% .0035%
U.S.A. 0.34% .0005% 0.41% .0037%
Canada 0.77% .0019% 1.74% .0106%
Japan 0.50% .0011% 1.81% .0420%
Europe 0.47% .0007% 0.31% .0013%
Belgium 0.47% .0016% 0.30% .0032%
Germany 0.47% .0016% 0.29% .0030%
Denmark 0.47% .0016% 0.27% .0030%
France 0.47% .0016% 0.29% .0031%
U.K. 0.47% .0016% 0.29% .0030%
Greece 0.47% .0016% 0.34% .0033%
Ireland 0.47% .0016% 0.27% .0029%
Italy 0.47% .0016% 0.27% .0030%
Netherlands 0.47% .0016% 0.28% .0030%
Finland 0.44% .0010% 1.11% .0023%
Norway 0.36% .0007% 0.87% .0013%
Notes: Compensating variation is expressed as a percentage of a region's 1992 income.
North America consists of Canada and the United States. Europe consists of the 11
countries listed below it.
trade area are equivalent to 0.43 percent of the group’s 1992 income.7 All countries gain
with Canada gaining the most (0.77 percent) and the United States gaining the least (0.34
percent). These are surprisingly large numbers given how low tariffs were in 1992. The
table also presents standard errors on the compensating variation associated with our
international tariff reductions. To our knowledge, this is a ﬁrst. Standard errors translate
the tension between the data and the model into uncertainty about the gains from trade.
7We have not yet derived an expression for the mean and variance of the compensating variation for
a group of countries such as North America in table 6. Let CVA({σg}∀g) = ∑i∈A s0
iCVi({σg}∀g) where
s0
i ≡ si/∑k∈A sk be the income-weighted compensating variation of country group A. Then the expected
welfare gain for country group A is E[CVA({σg}∀g)] = ∑i∈A s0
iE[CVi({σg}∀g)]. Calculating the variance of
the country group welfare gains is more complicated. We approximate its theoretically correct expression
with V[CVA({σg}∀g)] = ΣieAs2
i V[CVi({σg}∀g)].
21The reason for the tight standard errors will become clear shortly.
Table 6 also shows a second scenario. Suppose that in 1972 our 14 importing countries
had reduced tariffs against each other to their 1992 levels while leaving unchanged their
tariffsagainstcountriesoutsidethegroupof14. (Forthisscenario, Qgjt inthedenominator
of equations 17-18 is drawn from 1972 data.) From the right-hand-side panel of table
6, welfare would have risen by the equivalent of 0.67 percent of 1972 income. Thus,
historical tariff reductions are estimated to have raised world welfare substantially. What
is particularly interesting is the distribution of gains. Japan and Canada are by far the
biggest winners.
Table 7 shows thescenario of eliminating 1992 tariffsamong all 36trading partners. The
compensating variation of 1.80 percent is much larger than the 14-country result of 0.44
percent. Countries such as pre-NAFTA Mexico and import-substituters such as India,
Argentina, and Brazil stand out as the big winners. The gains to other middle-income
countries in Latin America and Asia are also striking. Even the United States gains by
0.58 percent.
Figure 2 is a useful tool for understanding the features of the model and the data that
are driving our welfare estimates. To produce the ﬁgure, we aggregated manufacturing
into a single sector so that it is a function of only a single elasticity of substitution σ. Figure
2 reports CVWORLD as a function of σ for each of the three scenarios reported in tables 6
and 7. Three things stand out.
First, for the scenario of eliminating 1992 tariffs among our 14 importers, the
ECVWORLD curve is ﬂat. This explains the small standard errors for this case. No matter
what we choose for the b σg and their standard errors, the mean of ECVWORLD will be
about 0.4 percent and will have a small standard error. This explains why we have not
yet said what we used for the b σg and their standard errors. We used our baseline ML
speciﬁcation (deﬁned in table 2) applied at the 3-digit ISIC industry level. The estimates
are reported in table 10 of Appendix E. Using the IV estimates yields virtually identical
results. For example, ECVWORLD is 0.44 percent when the b σg are estimated using the IV
22Table 7. Compensating Variation for the 36 Exporting Countries Table 7. Compensating Variation for the 36 Exporting Countries
Liberalize Trade Among 
the 36 Exporters
Liberalize Trade Among 
the 36 Exporters
E[CV i] Std. Err. E[CV i] Std. Err.
36 Exporters 1.80% .0084% North America 0.95% .0013%
14 Importers 0.67% .0010% Mexico 3.91% .0081%
Canada 1.16% .0023%
Europe 0.72% .0009% U.S.A. 0.58% .0013%
Austria 1.26% .0075%
Portugal 1.11% .0023% Asia 3.30% .0302%
Spain 1.08% .0024% India 7.66% .1121%
Sweden 0.68% .0009% Thailand 4.78% .0644%
EU-8 0.67% .0025% Sri Lanka 4.23% .0174%
Greece 0.67% .0025% Indonesia 3.31% .0350%
Finland 0.67% .0023% Malaysia 2.96% .0083%
Norway 0.51% .0013% Korea 2.81% .0266%
Japan 0.76% .0040%
Latin America 5.00% .0216% Singapore 0.31% .0047%
Argentina 7.15% .0353% Hong Kong 0.00% .0000%
Brazil 5.06% .0346%
Chile 3.85% .0041% Other
Venezuela 3.46% .0089% Tunisia 5.11% .0074%
Ecuador 3.11% .0041% Morocco 3.97% .0092%
New Zealand 1.86% .0046%
Australia 1.73% .0054%
Notes: Compensating variation is expressed as a percentage of a region's 1992 income. Since Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom all have identical results, we summarize this
result in the 'EU-8' row. North America consists of Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Europe consists of the 15
countries listed below it.
23Notes: To calculate this figure, manufacturing was aggregated into a single sector with a single elasticity of substitution.
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Figure 2. World Compensating Variation: ECVWORLD vs. σ
method described in column 5 of table 4 (bottom panel).
Second, for the other two scenarios, the ECVWORLD curve is concave in the range of the
estimated σg. This turns out to imply that the results for ECVWORLD are again independent
of whether we use the ML or IV estimates of the σg. The IV estimates yield larger b σg which
imply a smaller ECVWORLD. However, the IV estimates also yield much larger standard
errors on the σg. By the concavity of ECVWORLD, the larger standard errors imply a larger
ECVWORLD. As an empirical matter, these two effects cancel so that we obtain the same
ECVWORLD for both the ML and IV estimates.
Third, the ECVWORLD(σ) are downward sloping. This represents a major problem with
the interface between the theory and the data, a problem that we suspect reﬂects the
dominance of the theory over the data. The slope of ECVWORLD(σ) is determined by
24two effects. To see this, drop g subscripts, re-write the equation (1) sub-utility function
as e Ui(σ, q(σ)) to reﬂect the fact that σ enters utility both as a parameter and, via equation
(2), as a determinant of output. There are thus two effects of an increase in σ: (1) the
pure preference effect, ∂e Ui/∂σ holding q ﬁxed and (2) the general equilibrium effect
(∂e Ui/∂q)/(∂q/∂σ). The signs of these two effects are in general ambiguous. However,
they take on their expected signs when evaluated at any most-favoured nation (MFN)
tariff rate i.e., at any τij that is independent of j. Speciﬁcally, the pure preference effect is
negative (a rise in σ reduces love of variety) and the general equilibrium effect is positive
(a rise in σ raises q(σ) and thus raises consumer surplus). The downward sloping lines in
ﬁgure 2 show that the pure preference effect dominates the core general equilibrium effects of the
model. This is deeply disturbing. It also means that sensitivity analysis reporting how com-
pensating variation depends on σ is misleading unless the pure preference and general
equilibrium effects are separated out. This is not currently done in the CGE literature, but
should be done in the future.
The gains from trade just reported are large. However, they are probably lower bounds
on the world gains implied by the monopolistic competition model. There are three
reasons for this. First, although we have endogenized the Qjt so that the level and
international distribution of production is endogenous, the only way this shows up in the
estimates of compensating variation is via the estimates of the b σg. Since our estimates of
compensating variation are ex post not all that sensitive to whether ML or IV estimates of
theb σg areused, itishardtoargueexpostthatwearecapturingthewelfarelossesthatresult
fromaninefﬁcientworldwideallocationofproduction. Thus, intextbookfashionwearelikely
only estimating the consumption effect i.e., the welfare losses that arise because consumers face
prices that are higher than producer prices. Second, by assuming a Cobb-Douglas upper-tier
utility structure we have not allowed for gains due to substitution from non-tradeable
to tradeable goods. Third, there are production effects that cannot be captured in a
CES monopolistic competition model because the model implies that producer price and
output levels are independent of the tariff. In a more general model, one might expect
25tariff reductions to lower producer prices and increase ﬁrm-level output.
To summarize, we have precisely estimated very large gains from tariff liberalization.
Against this we have documented a number of problems which indicate that the precision
of the estimates of compensating variation is likely driven more by the model than by the
data. They also suggest a disturbing dominance of the pure preference effect over core
general equilibrium effects.
7. The Second Goal: Does the Model Do Violence to the Data?
Until now the paper has dealt primarily with our ﬁrst goal, namely, estimation of the
welfare gains from trade. The analysis was conducted on the assumption that the CES
monopolistic competition model is correctly speciﬁed. For the remainder of the paper we
turn to our second goal of questioning this assumption. Figure 1 above painted a picture
of a model that performs remarkably well. Is this really the case or are the results being
driven by unexpected features of the data or model? It is to this question that the full
weight of econometric sensitivity analysis can be brought to bear. In examining the model
for mis-speciﬁcation our focus is on the model’s three key predictions.
1. ln Mijt depends linearly on lnQjt primarily via the data identity ΣiMijt = Qjt. (See
equation 4.) Note that this prediction has little economic content.
2. ln Mijt depends linearly on lnsit via the homotheticity of demand. This is a behavi-
oural prediction.
3. ln Mijt depends linearly on lnΦijt via CES price effects and general equilibrium inter-
actions. Referring to the equation (6) deﬁnition of Φijt (and dropping g subscripts),
the numerator of Φijt is just τ−σ
ijt /Σkτ1−σ
ikt Qkt which is closely related to the CES price
index and enters the model behaviourally via utility maximization. The denomin-
ator of Φijt is Σnsntτ−σ
njt /Σkτ1−σ
nkt Qkt which is related to a market potential function
and captures the most important general equilibrium relationships of the model. Φijt
26therefore describes the deepest behavioural and general equilibrium aspects of the
model. It is rightly the focus of this paper.
We examine these three implications in detail.
8. The Price Term Φijt
Figure 3 provides three plots that shed light on the performance of the price term. The top
panel plots ln Mijt against lnsitΦijtQjt and reinforces how wonderfully the model ﬁts. The
middle panel plots ln Mijt against lnΦijt and suggests that only a small part of the good
ﬁt is being driven by the price term. One might think that a bivariate plot of this form
is misleading because of the covariances between the price, income, and output terms.
To control for this, the bottom panel of ﬁgure 3 plots ln(Mijt/sitQjt) against lnΦijt. The
ﬁt is now tighter. The plots also report R2 statistics derived from a bivariate regression of
the vertical-axis variable against the horizontal-axis variable. ‘R2 All’ is the R2 from the
bivariate regression. For example, in the bottom panel the price term explains 16 percent
of the sample variation in ln(Mijt/sitQjt).
In these plots and those to follow, lnΦijt = Φijt(b σ) is evaluated at b σ = 5.30 taken from
our table 2 ML baseline estimate. Similar results hold for the IV estimates of b σ as well.
Since the baseline estimate uses a GLS estimator, all data are scaled by the estimated
standard error of the residuals εijt i.e., by the ψij deﬁned at the start of section 4. Each
plot has 2,520 observations. This corresponds to 504 country pairs (14 imports × 36
exporters) in each of 5 years (1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992). Note that we have returned
to working with aggregate manufacturing.
It is frequently argued that love-of-variety models are inappropriate for the trade of
poorer countries. To examine this, we split the sample into two groups. The rich group
includes the 20 countries that are in our group of 14 importers and/or have 1982 World
Bank per capitagross domestic product (GDP) inexcess of $6,000. The poorgroup consists
of the remaining 16 countries in our sample. Each plot in ﬁgure 3 has three types of
markers: (1) a ‘o’ for domestic observations (i,i) where in our data i is always a rich
27R
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Figure 3. The Price Term in Levels (1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992)
28country; (2) an ‘x’ for trade between rich importers and rich exports; and, (3) a ‘+’ for
trade between rich importers and poor exporters. ‘R2 Rich’ is the R2 from a bivariate
regression involving only ‘x’ or rich-rich observations. ‘R2 Poor’ is the R2 from a bivariate
regression involving only ‘+’ or rich-poor observations. Is there any evidence that the
model performs better for rich countries than for poor countries? The answer is no: the
‘R2 Rich’ statistics of ﬁgure 3 are barely larger than the ‘R2 Poor’statistics.
We have argued hard for the importance of separating out within country-pair sample
variation from between country-pair sample variation. Our contention is that the within
variation is cleaner for estimating price effects because it requires fewer assumptions
about the similarity of country pairs. To examine this cleaner ‘within’ sample variation
we differenced the data using a 20-year difference. This leaves us with 504 observations,
oneforeachcountrypair. Thedifferenceddataareplottedinﬁgure4. Forexample, thetop
panel plots ∆ln Mijt ≡ ln Mij1992 −ln Mij1972 against ∆lnsitΦijtQjt ≡ lnsi1992Φij1992Qj1992 −
lnsi1972Φij1972Qj1972. Several facts emerge. Comparing the top panels of ﬁgures 3 and 4, the
model does not ﬁt the differenced data nearly as well as the levels data. This is reﬂected
in the ‘R2 All’ statistic which has fallen from 0.78 to only 0.21. Notice from the ‘R2 Poor’
statistic of 0.30 that almost all of the good ﬁt is being driven by rich-country imports from
poor countries. This is reminiscent of Hummels and Levinsohn (1995).
The two lower panels of ﬁgure 3 show the real kicker. The price term Φijt literally contrib-
utes nothing to the analysis of changing trade patterns. This is reﬂected in the ‘R2 All’ statistics
of 0.02 and 0.01. This is a deeply disturbing result. The CES monopolistic competition
model has been used extensively for assessing the welfare gains from trade. Yet if one
asks “For a given pair of countries, do changes in tariffs over time predict changes in
bilateral trade ﬂows?” the answer from this model is a resounding “No.” Restated, the
data are completely at odds with the model’s core behavioural and general equilibrium
predictions about the impact of trade liberalization.
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Figure 4. The Price Term in Changes: 1992 − 1972
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Figure 5. The Income (sit) and Data-Identity (Qjt) Terms in Changes: 1992 − 1972
9. Income and Data-Identity Terms
The income (sit) and data-identity (Qjt) terms have been examined directly or indirectly
by a large number of researchers. Indeed, the model ln Mijt = lnsit +lnQjt is very much a
gravity equation. One therefore needs a good reason for revisiting the model. We think we
have one. The left-hand panel of ﬁgure 5 plots ∆ln Mijt ≡ ln Mij1992 − ln Mij1972 against
∆lnsit ≡ lnsi1992 − lnsi1972. The relationship is weak: the ‘R2 All’ statistic is 0.00. This
means that the income term explains absolutely none of the within country-pair sample variation.
We do not think that most researchers realize this. Jensen (2000) is an exception.8
The right-hand panel of ﬁgure 5 plots ∆ln Mijt against ∆lnQjt ≡ lnQj1992 − lnQj1972.
The striking feature of the plot is that it is very similar to the ﬁgure 4 plot of ∆ln Mijt
against ∆lnsitΦijtQjt. To conﬁrm this, note that the ‘R2 All’ statistics of ﬁgure 5 (left-hand
plot) and ﬁgure 4 (top plot) are identical. This means that almost all of the good ﬁt of the
CES monopolistic competition model comes from the data-identity term Qjt. Again, the
8We are grateful to Rob Feenstra for pointing out that an earlier draft contained some odd gravity results
that needed to be investigated.
31predictive success is highest for observations involving rich-country imports from poor
countries. The ‘R2 Poor’ statistic is 0.25. This raises a key question as to why small
producers export a little to all partners rather than exporting everything to just a small
group of partners. What is the economic channel through which this comes about? The
most obvious possibility is that these small producers have a comparative cost advantage
in some niche product demanded in small amounts by all importers. But what is the
source of this comparative cost advantage and what is the niche? The CES model is about
suchniches, butitstretchesthemodeltosaythateverysmallproducerineverypoorcoun-
try produces a niche variety. The results of Hallak (2001) and Schott (2001) suggest that
quality is important. Alternatively, it may be a Ricardian story. Of course, the two are not
neatly separable. For example, Brazil has a Ricardian cost advantage in cheap low-quality
steel rails, but not in the high-quality steel sheets needed for automobile panels. Clearly,
more work is needed to understand this issue. Understanding the process generating the
Qjt is apparently more crucial for understanding trade ﬂows than previously recognized
in the empirical literature surrounding these type of equations.
To summarize, recall that the deep behavioural and general equilibrium aspects of the
model are captured by the price and income terms (Φijt and sit). Yet these terms contribute
only modestly to explaining the total sample variation and explain absolutely none of
the within country-pair sample variation. The economics of the CES monopolistic model
contributes much less to understanding trade ﬂows than has previously been recognized.
The data-identity term (Qjt) drives most of the within country-pair sample ﬁt. As such,
much more attention must be given to understanding the location-of-production aspects
of the model.
10. The Between Country-Pair Sample Variation: Fixed Effects
The ﬁxed effects λij measure the average prediction error of each country pair. One
explanationofthispredictionerroristhattherearemanymoretradecoststhanjustthetar-
iffs and discriminatory internal taxes that we are measuring. Most obvious of these are the
32              Note : To make the relationship between the fixed effects and distance look its strongest, we set D ii = 55 km rather than 0 km.
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Figure 6. Distance (lnDij) vs. Country-pair Fixed Effects (λij)
trade costs associated with distance Dij between trading partners. Lai (1999) introduced
distance into our estimating equation by replacing τijt with τijtDα
ij in the expression for Φijt.
However, he found that it did not much affect the results regarding tariffs. Since distance
is time invariant it is natural to ask whether distance enters the estimating equation via
the time-invariant λij rather than via the Φijt.
Figure 6 plots the λij ﬁxed effects against lnDij.9 To begin with, most of the λij are
negative meaning that there is much less trade than is predicted by the theory. In the plot,
‘o’ denotes an (i,i) observation, ‘+’ denotes an observation for which i and j are adjacent,
9Data are from Antweiler (1995) and are based on the weighted average distance between all city pairs
in the two countries i and j. For example, if there are 2 cities in country i and 3 cities in country j then there
are 6 city pairs. The weights used in aggregating the 6 city pairs are based on the populations of the cities.
Only cities with population in excess of 1,000,000 are included in the calculations.
33and ‘x’ denotes all other observations. The overall impression conveyed by ﬁgure 6 is that
the ﬁxed effects are indeed explained by distance. There are, however, some caveats. First,
the solid line is the regression line of λij on lnDij. The dashed lines shift the regression
line by ±ln2, meaning that all observations outside the dashed lines involve predictions
that are off by more than 100 percent. About half of the observations lie outside the 100
percent error lines. Second, consider the dispersion of the average prediction error expb λij
for different values of distance. There is a 74-fold dispersion in the prediction error for
own-country observations (i,i), a 146-fold dispersion in the prediction error for adjacent
countries, and over a 1,000-fold dispersion in the prediction error for country pairs that
are separated by distances of between 8,000 and 9,000 kilometres. These are large errors.
Third, consider the 351 observations with Dij > 5,000. These represent 70 percent of the
observations and so are in no sense a minor subsample. For this group, the R2 from a
regression of λij on lnDij is 0.0002 i.e., there is no relationship between the ﬁxed effects
and distance for this subsample. Thus, distance by itself far from explains all or even most of
the country-pair sample variation.
11. Speciﬁcation Tests and Model Selection
In the CGE literature there is no sense in which one can formally compare the performance
of one model with another. Calibration ensures that both will ﬁt the data exactly. (For
a balanced discussion of this point, see Dawkins, Srinivasan and Whalley 2001.) Model
comparison can be done in the econometric-based international trade literature, but rarely
is. We now turn to ﬁlling this gap. Each row of table 8 presents an alternative model
that will be compared to the CES monopolistic competition model. Row 1 is a distance
model with two regressors, lnDij and (lnDij)2. (The models in rows 1-4 each have two
regressors.) Row 2 is an income-similarity model that uses the products of country-pair
GDPs (Yi) and PPP-adjusted per capita GDPs (yi). Row 3 is an endowments-based model.
Li is country i’s population, Hi is the population that completed high school, and Ki is
capital stock. Data are in part from Summers and Heston (1991) and Barro and Lee
34Table 8. Non-Nested Hypothesis Testing (Speciﬁcation Testing) Table 8.  Non-Nested Hypothesis Testing (Specification Testing)
MacKinnon's P-Statistic Correlations of lnM ijt
H0: lns itΦijtQ jt H0: X ijtβ with its prediction
H1: X ijtβ H1: lns itΦijtQ jt Total Within Between
Row Model (1) (2) (3)   (4)   (5)  
1 lnD ij 4.69 11.06 0.34 0.38 0.34
(lnD ij)
2
2 ln(Y it Y jt)/(Y it+Y jt) 11.45 6.32 0.67 0.62 0.67
ln(y it y jt)/(y it+y jt)
3 |H it/L it-H jt/L jt| 0.66 11.53 -0.21 0.36 -0.24
|K it/L it-K jt/L jt|
4 |H it/L it-H jt/L jt| ln(s itQ jt) 0.32 11.18 0.08 0.38 0.06
|K it/L it-K jt/L jt| ln(s itQ jt)
5 lnτijt 2.93 9.42 0.31 0.38 0.32




MacKinnon's non-nested P-statistic is asymptotically a t-statistic with over 2,000 degrees of freedom.
Each row is an alternative specification. D ij is the weighted distance between major cities in countries i and j, Y it is
country i's GDP, y it is i's per capita GDP, H it is i's population that completed high school, L it is i's labour force, and
K it is i's capital stock. All specifications are estimated using an AR(1) correction, but no GLS, fixed effect, or first-
observation corrections. 
The 'Correlations' columns report the correlation between ln(M ijt) and X ijtβ where X ijt is described in the 'Model'
column.
(1993). Row 4 follows the Evenett and Keller (2002) observation that a combination of
monopolistic competition and factor endowments offers a better explanation of trade than
either one separately. Row 5 is a naive tariff model.
Our speciﬁcation test is MacKinnon’s non-nested P-test (Davidson and MacKinnon,
1993). Column 1 of table 8 reports the P-statistic when the null is lnsitΦijtQjt and the
35alternative is the model listed in the ‘Model’ column.10 The reported P-tests have a
t-distribution with just over 2,000 degrees of freedom. From column 1, the CES mono-
polistic competition model is mis-speciﬁed against the distance, income-similarity, and
naive tariff models. Bearing in mind the large sample size and the likely low power of the
P-test, one should be looking for very large values of the P-statistic. Surprisingly, there is
only one very large P-statistic: 11.45 for the income-similarity model. The CES monopolistic
competition model is resoundingly rejected by a model featuring trading-partner similarity in
income and per capita income.
We have puzzled over why the CES model is only mis-speciﬁed against the income-
similarity model. After all, each model would seem to be explaining different and im-
portant features of the data. The answer can be found by looking at correlations between
ln Mijt and its predictions. From column 3 of table 8, the correlations are by far the highest
fortheincome-similaritymodel(0.67)andtheCESmonopolisticcompetitionmodel(0.71).
One can decompose such correlation into the correlation within country pairs and the
correlation between country pairs. Within-country-pair correlations capture the evolution
of trade ﬂows over time. The between-country-pair correlations capture the differences in
trade ﬂows across country pairs. From column 4, the income-similarity model has by far
the highest within country-pair correlation. This is not hard to interpret. Trade ﬂows are
sensitive to business cycle conditions. The income-similarity model, with its GDP terms, is the
model that best captures these Keynesian income dynamics. The ﬂip side of this is that the CES
monopolistic competition model does poorly at explaining cyclical trade movements.
Returning to issues of model mis-speciﬁcation, we can also reverse the question asked.
To what extent are the other models commonly considered in the literature mis-speciﬁed?
10 Thereisanissueincomparingthemodelln Mijt = lnsitΦijtQjt +λij +εijt againstanalternativeln Mijt =
βXijt + λ0
ij + ε0
ijt in that rejection of no mis-speciﬁcation may be coming from the difference between λij
and λ0
ij. This would be an uninteresting result. We therefore consider models with λij = λ0
ij = 0. This
means that we must add an intercept to the models. Further, since the alternative hypotheses all have
many free parameters in the sense that they are identiﬁed only up to a linear transformation, we also add
an additional slope parameter to the CES monopolistic competition model. Thus, the null hypothesis is
ln Mijt = α + βlnsitΦijt(b σ)Qjt + εijt where εijt = ρεij,t−1 + νijt and where the νijt are independently and
identically distributed. The ML estimate of σ for this model (with an AR(1) correction, but no ﬁxed effect,
GLS, or ﬁrst-observation corrections) is b σ = 5.57. The alternative hypothesis is ln Mijt = βXijt + ε0
ijt where
Xijt is listed in the ‘Model’ column of table 8 and the ε0
ijt have the same properties as the εijt.
36Given the large number of problems that we have identiﬁed with the CES model, the
surprising feature is that many of the alternative models are also mis-speciﬁed. See
column 2 of table 8. These include the distance model (P = 11.06), the Heckscher-Ohlin
model (P = 11.53), the Evenett-Keller-style model (P = 11.18), and the naive tariff model
(P = 9.42). Thus, other models in the literature appear to suffer problems that are at least as severe
as those faced by the CES monopolistic competition model.
12. Conclusions
As currently implemented, the workhorse econometric models of international trade
(monopolistic competition, Heckscher-Ohlin, and gravity) do not rigorously incorporate
product prices into their estimating equations and so are of limited value for assessing the
welfare gains from trade liberalization. We modelled general equilibrium product price
effects using the CES monopolistic competition model. We then estimated the model
and, mimicking CGE models, used the model to estimate the compensating variation
associated with trade liberalization. We estimated large welfare gains from liberalization.
Unlike CGE models, we offered standard errors as well. These standard errors were
surprisingly small and we offered a graphic explanation of this (ﬁgure 2).
However, standard errors are a very incomplete measure of whether or not a model is
well-speciﬁed. Going beyond CGE models, we presented extensive speciﬁcation testing
aimed at isolating the violence done by the model to the data. We found a number of
signiﬁcant forms of mis-speciﬁcation.
1. (lnΦijt) The price term – which captures the core behavioural and general equilibrium
aspects of the model – is badly mis-speciﬁed. It explains only 16 percent of the
variation in ln Mijt (ﬁgure 3). Worse, it explains only 2 percent of the cleaner within
country-pair sample variation i.e., the variation in ln Mij1992 − ln Mij1972 (ﬁgure 4).
This is a deeply disturbing result. It means that the tension between the model and
the data is greatest for the price effects that lie at the heart of trade liberalization.
372. (lnsit) The other core behavioural prediction of the CES monopolistic competition
model is its prediction about unit income elasticities. We found that the income term
lnsit explains 0 percent of the long-run, within country-pair sample variation (ﬁgure
5). Another piece of this ‘income puzzle’ is that the CES monopolistic competition
model is mis-speciﬁed against the income similarity model precisely because the in-
comesimilaritymodelisbetterattrackingmedium-runKeynesianincomedynamics
(table 8).
3. (lnQjt) Taken together, these ﬁrst two points mean that the good ﬁt of the CES mono-
polistic competition model is being driven by the output term. It explains 21 percent
of the within country-pair sample variation (ﬁgure 5). What makes this an odd result
is that Qjt enters the model via a data identity (equation 4) and so has no behavioural
or general equilibrium interpretation per se. What makes the situation even more
puzzling is that lnQjt matters most for country pairs where j (the exporter) is a poor
country. One would have expected the model to work best when both partners are
rich.
A number of more familiar empirical regularities also appeared. For one, there is
substantial missing trade (ﬁgures 1 and 6). Part of this can be explained by our limited
measure of trade restrictions, namely tariffs and discriminatory internal taxes, which
exclude, for example, transport costs. However, it is equally clear that even after con-
trolling for distance there remain spectacular differences between observed and predicted
trade (ﬁgure 6). For another, trading partner similarity as measured by per capita GDP
is an important determinant of trade (table 8), suggesting that product quality or other
unobserved product attributes matter. Finally, we provided evidence that all of the major
models of international trade are mis-speciﬁed (table 8).
It strikes us that the cart we have been riding is stuck up to its axels in mud – and
empirical researchers will need help getting it unstuck. It also strikes us that the empirical
anomalies listed above offer important theoretical guidance for the way ahead. First, our
work on AR(1) modelling with ﬁxed effects indicates that much more attention must be
38given to understanding trade dynamics. (See section 5.) Second, the dual role played by
σ as both a preference parameter and a mark-up parameter must be divorced. Separate
preference and mark-up parameters are needed. (See sections 5 and 6.) Third, given that
the good ﬁt of the CES monopolistic competition model is driven by the output term Qjt,
more work is needed to understand how the location of production depends on tariffs in
this class of models. Each of these three points is manageable. It is simply a question of
persuading theorists and empirical researchers to start pulling on the same cart.
39Appendix
Appendix A. The Maximum Likelihood Estimator
We derive the likelihood function for a single industry and therefore drop the g subscripts.
We also set the δij = 1 in order to minimize notation. Reintroducing the δij is trivial. Deﬁne
εij ≡ (εij1, ..., εij5)0. Then
Eεijε0
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−2 Ψ where Ψ is a 5 × 5 matrix with a diagonal band of (1,1 +
ρ2,1+ρ2,1+ρ2,1), with bands just above and below the diagonal containing −ρ, and with

















where νijt = εijt − ρεij,t−1. Note that this is one of several ways of stating that we are












To develop the objective function recall that εijt = ln Mijt − lnsitΦijt(σ)Qjt − λij and
deﬁne yijt ≡ ln Mijt, xijt(σ) ≡ lnsitΦijt(σ)Qjt, ∆ρyijt ≡ yijt − ρyij,t−1, and ∆ρxijt(σ) ≡























The NLS estimator minimizes SSE. The ML estimator minimizes the loglikelihood func-
tion:
£(σ,ρ,ω,η,{λij}∀ij) = −(5 × 504/2)lnη2 − 5ωΣ14
i=1Σ36
j=1 ln(sisj) + (504/2)ln(1 − ρ2)
−SSE(σ,ρ,ω,η,{λij}∀ij)/2 .





The maximizing value of the ﬁxed effects is given by11
λML
ij =





(1 + ρ) + (1 − ρ)(5 − 1)
. (A 5)
To obtain the ML estimator with the ﬁrst observation eliminated (column 6 of table 2),
delete the equation (A 4) term (1 − ρ2)

yij1 − xij1(σ) − λij
2, replace the year total of 5
with 4, and trivially recompute λML
ij .
Appendix B. GMM IV
This section describes the IV estimator of equation (13). Re-write this equation using the
ﬁrst difference operator ∆ to obtain
∆yijt = ρ∆yij,t−1 +∆∆ρxijt(σ) +∆νijt t > 2 . (A 6)
The concern about endogeneity is that ∆yij,t−1 and ∆∆ρxijt(σ) are correlated with ∆νijt.
Consider the moment restrictions in equation (14), namely, Eyijs∆νijt = 0 for s =
1,..., t − 2 and t > 2. Following a suggestion about differencing in Arellano (1989),
we base our instruments on the following linear transformation of the moment restric-
tions: Eyij1∆νij3 = 0, Eyij1∆νij4 = 0, E∆yij2∆νij4 = 0, Eyij1∆νij5 = 0, E∆yij2∆νij5 = 0,
and E∆yij3∆νij5 = 0. These translate into the following instrument matrix for the three







yij1 0 0 0 0 0
0 yij1 ∆yij2 0 0 0
0 0 0 yij1 ∆yij2 ∆yij3


 . (A 7)
From equation (15), another set of moment restrictions is E∆ρxijs∆νijt = 0 for s =
1,..., t − 2 and t > 2. Applying a similar linear transformation as before while recog-
nizing that the lack of availability of xij0 makes ∆ρxij1 and ∆∆ρxij2 unavailable leads to the
following linear transformation of the moment restrictions: Exij1∆νij3 = 0, Exij1∆νij4 = 0,
E∆ρxij2∆νij4 = 0, Exij1∆νij5 = 0, E∆ρxij2∆νij5 = 0, and E∆∆ρxij3∆νij5 = 0. The use of
11It is of interest to note that the effective degrees of freedom per (i,j) pair is given by the denominator of
this expression so that if ρ is close to 1 the effective degrees of freedom is 2. That is, the greater is the serial
correlation, the smaller is the effective degrees of freedom.
41differences ∆∆ρxij3 rather than levels ∆ρxij3 is endorsed by (Sevestre and Trognon, 1996,






xij1 0 0 0 0 0
0 xij1 ∆ρxij2 0 0 0
0 0 0 xij1 ∆ρxij2 ∆∆ρxij3


 . (A 8)
Finally, when the xijt are exogenous we have the additional moment restrictions
E∆ρxijs∆νijt = 0 for s = t − 1, t and t > 2. This leads to the moment restric-
tions E∆∆ρxij3∆νij3 = 0, E∆∆ρxij3∆νij4 = 0, E∆∆ρxij4∆νij4 = 0, E∆∆ρxij3∆νij5 = 0,







∆∆ρxij3 0 0 0 0 0
0 ∆∆ρxij3 ∆∆ρxij4 0 0 0
0 0 0 ∆∆ρxij3 ∆∆ρxij4 ∆∆ρxij5


 . (A 9)
We can now deﬁne the GMM objective function. When the xijt are exogenous deﬁne















Let Z be the stacked Zij. Z has 1,512 rows (36 exporters × 14 importers × 3 years) and
12 columns. Let ∆ν be the stacked residuals. The GMM estimator minimizes ∆ν0PZ∆ν
where PZ ≡ ZANZ0, AN ≡ 36 × 14(ΣijZ0
ijΩZij)−1 and Ω is a (3 × 3 matrix with twos on
the diagonal, minus ones on the ﬁrst subdiagonals and zeroes otherwise. Ω is the GLS
correction for the fact that E(νijt − νij,t−1)2 = 2Eν2
ijt = 2η2 and E(νijt − νij,t−1)(νij,t−1 −
νij,t−2) = −Eν2
ij,t−1 = −η2 where η2 is deﬁned in equation (9) (with ω = 0).
Appendix C. The Tariff Data
Bilateral tariff rates for our 14 importers (see table 1) are from the following sources:
A. UNCTAD’s 1993 TRAINS database (CD-ROM). This contains complete bilateral tariff
data τA
gijt for all 36 countries in 1992. Data on preferential agreements and discrim-
inatory internal taxes are described in the extensive table notes included with the
CD-ROM. The classiﬁcation system is the Harmonized System (HS).
B. The Tokyo-Round GATT Tariff Study. This contains complete bilateral tariff data τB
gijt
for our 14 importers for the years 1979, 1983, and 1987. The data were originally
developed for Treﬂer (1993). The classiﬁcation system is HS.
C. The Kennedy-Round GATT Tariff Study as reported in Deardorff and Stern (1986). This
contains average tariff data τC
git for all of our importers (except Greece) for 1972
and 1979. It also includes Sweden, Austria, Australia, and New Zealand. The
classiﬁcation system is ISIC(Rev. 2).
42D. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFS) and International Finance Statistics Yearbook
(IFS).Thesepublicationscontaindataonimportduties, totalimportsandhencetariff
rates τD
it for all 36 countries for the 1972-92 period. There is no industry dimension.
Data sources A and B were converted to 3-digit ISIC using a converter we developed
from Statistics Canada data. The resulting data for 1979, 1983, 1987, and 1992 were then





(For Greece, the formula is the same, but with τC
git replaced by τD
it .) Since tariff concessions
were linear (the so-called ‘Swiss Rule’) and MFN-based over the 1972-79 period, this
formula will be quite accurate. Data for 1977 and 1982 are close enough to 1979 and 1983
to be linearly interpolated accurately. The result is complete data for 1972, 1977, 1982,
1987, and 1992.
As discussed in section 2, the only place where the τgijt for the remaining 22 countries
enter the estimating equation is in the denominator of equation (6). The τgijt thus play a
very limited role. Therefore, it is much less important to have accurate bilateral tariff rates
for these remaining 22 countries. The data sources for these countries are, in addition to
the above,
E. OECD Indicators of Tariff and Non-tariff Trade Barriers (CD-ROM). This contains average
tariff data τE
git for Sweden, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Australia, and New Zealand in
1988 and 1992. The classiﬁcation system is ISIC.
F. UNCTADDirectoryofImportRegimes(DIR).ThisUNCTADpublicationcontainsaverage
tariff rates τF
git for the remaining 16 non-OECD countries. The data are for 3 years,
one each from the 1981-83, 1984-1986, and 1987-89 periods. The classiﬁcation system
is closely related to ISIC.
The data for the remaining 22 countries were constructed as follows. For Sweden, Austria,
Australia, and New Zealand we used the formula in equation (A 10), but with data source




gi92). For Spain and Portugal we used the formula in equation (A 10), but
with data source E in place of C for 1988 and data source D for earlier years. For the 16
remaining (developing) countries we again used the formula in equation (A 10), but with
data source F in place of C for the 1980s and data source D for earlier years.
Appendix D. Identiﬁcation
Identiﬁcation of the σg is not a trivial matter. Consider the simple case where there is no
home bias (δgij = 1 for all i and j) and where tariffs are applied on an MFN basis (τgij = τgi
43Table 9. Bilateral Tariff Rates for Aggregate Manufacturing, 1992 Table 10. 1992 Bilateral Tariff Rates for Aggregate Manufacturing
Exporters
U.S.A. Canada Europe (11) Japan Other Europe Asia
U.S.A. 0% 1% 4% 4% 4% 5%
Canada 3% 0% 7% 7% 8% 8%
Japan 4% 3% 4% 0% 5% 4%
Europe (11) 5% 4% 0% 7% 0% 5%










for all g, i and j). In this case, σg disappears as an argument of Φgij(σg). That is, σg is not
identiﬁed. This is re-assuring for it means that we are identifying σg off the right source
of sample variation, namely, each importer’s tariff variation across time and partners (as
opposed to variation across importers).
In light of this, departures from MFN are a key source of sample variation. This raises
the question of whether a country’s tariff variation across partners is due to departures
from MFN or to aggregation bias associated with product mix differences within 3-digit
ISIC industries. Table 9 sheds light on this. For the United States, average 1992 tariff rates
are similar across all trading partners except Canada. This reﬂects the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement. Hence, the tariff variation is due to departures from MFN. Likewise
for Canada. For Europe, most of the sample variation is associated with the European
customs union. However, there is some variation across non-European partners which
evidences aggregation bias. This bias disappears when we move to the 3-digit ISIC
level. The conclusion, then, is that it is preferential trading arrangements rather than
aggregation bias that drives the sample variation. This is reassuring.
Appendix E. Estimates of σg By Industry
Table 10 reports the ML results by industry for the baseline speciﬁcation in column 1 of
table2. Exceptfor3industries(Petroleumproducts, petroleumreﬁning, andinstruments),
the b σg are all positive. However, no obvious pattern jumps out in which the rank of the b σg
is readily related to a priori industry characteristics. For example, the industries with the
largest b σg are industrial chemicals and electric and electronic equipment.
Implicitly we are judging the reasonableness of the b σg by asking whether they are
small for industries that are best characterized by monopolistic competition and large
44Table 10. Estimates by Industry Table 9. Estimates by Industry
ML Estimator
     σg     Std. Err.
     (1)     (2) (3)
Food Products 2.53 0.67 0.84
Industrial Chemicals 21.41 0.98 0.81
Elec. Mach. & Electronics 18.86 0.79 0.81
Machinery, Non-electric 12.13 0.84 0.80
Misc. Manufacturing 14.42 0.92 0.80
Pharmaceuticals etc 15.99 0.98 0.77
Plastic Products 15.69 0.56 0.77
Textiles 3.50 0.72 0.75
Fabricated Metal Products 7.48 0.65 0.74
Instruments -5.43 1.54 0.73
Leather Products 6.02 1.93 0.69
Non-ferrous Metals 8.13 1.06 0.66
Transport Equipment 3.10 1.30 0.65
Clay & Cement Products 7.71 0.98 0.64
Apparel 4.25 0.53 0.63
Glass Products 5.41 0.74 0.61
Wood Products 2.91 0.69 0.60
Iron & Steel 13.74 2.15 0.59
Rubber Products 15.81 1.48 0.59
Beverages 3.71 0.64 0.58
Printing & Publishing 1.15 0.79 0.57
Furniture 8.74 0.89 0.53
Pottery & China 5.41 0.98 0.49
Pulp & Paper 4.79 1.57 0.49
Footwear 5.59 0.74 0.41
Tobacco 1.96 0.22 0.29
Petroleum Refineries -0.16 2.09 0.18
Misc. Petro & Coal Prods. -9.72 2.19 0.13
Correlation of 
ln(M gijt) with 
ln(s itΦgijtQ gjt)
Notes: Each specification is in logs with AR(1), fixed effect, and GLS corrections. There
is no home bias (δij = 1 for all i and j) in any specification.
45for industries that are best characterized by perfect competition. By this criterion, the
b σg are not reasonable. A very different criterion recognizes that one size does not ﬁt all.
For industries that are poorly characterized by monopolistic competition the estimates
of the b σg should be meaningless. If so, we should examine whether the correlation
between predicted and actual imports is highest for industries best characterized by
monopolistic competition. Table 10 does just this. It sorts industries by the correlation
between ln Mgijt and lnsitΦgijtQjt. This criterion makes some sense of the estimates. The
correlation between columns 1 and 3 is 0.59. By and large, the top of the list is dominated
by industries best characterized by monopolistic competition e.g., electric and electronic
equipment, pharmaceuticals, and machinery. Likewise, thebottomof thelistisdominated
by industries that are more perfectly competitive such as pulp and paper, footwear, and
furniture. There are, of course, exceptions such as transport equipment. By and large
though, table 10 supports the view that the model works well for industries that are best
characterized by monopolistic competition and the model works very poorly elsewhere.
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